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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC UTILITIES-VALUATION--JUDICIAL REVIEW or FINDINGS or PUBLIC
SERVICE Com ISSIONS.-The Public Service Commission of Maryland, after
revaluation of the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company's property,
ordered a reduction of rates. The rate base used by the Commission was
ascertained by "trending" the 1923 valuation, the book cost of annual addi-
tions, and the depreciation to dollar values as of 1932 by the use of "trans-
lators" derived from a composite of price index numbers. The District Court
set aside the rates and entered a valuation of its own based largely on book
historical cost.' On appeal by the Commission the Supreme Court disap-
proved the lower court's valuation and its action in entering it, but affirmed
its order setting aside the Commission rates, because the method of the
Commission in arriving at its rate base was "inapt," "inappropriate,"
arbitrary, and fundamentally erroneous. West v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co. (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1935) 55 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894.
The emphasis of the Court in .setting aside the rates is on the erroneous
method used in fixing them and not on their confiscatory character. The
case raises two problems: a) the extent of judicial review over the procedure
of public utility commissions in arriving'at valuation conclusions; b) ad-
ministrative method as a constitutional issue, apart from confiscation.
There is no doubt that judicial review of regulatory orders extends to
the procedure of regulatory agencies in making the orders.2 They have been
invalidated by the courts for absence, inadequacy, or manifest unfairness of
hearing;3 for entrance without evidence;4 because matters of fact were con-
sidered which were not in the record;5 because the Commission considered
facts which could not legally influence its judgment;6 because the evidence,
as a matter of law, failed to support the findings;7 because the Commission
IChesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. West, et al. (Md. Dist. Ct.,
1934) 7 Fed. Supp. 214. See also the Commission's valuation of the same
Company in 1923, Chesapeake and P. Telephone Co. v. Whitman et al.
(1925) 3 Fed. Supp. 938.
2 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. (1909). 215 U. S. 450,
30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed. 280; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Union Pac. Ry.
(1912) 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308; Interstate Com. Comm.
v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (1910) 216 U. S. 544, 30 Sup. Ct. 417, 54 L. Ed. 609;
Railroad Comm. v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. (1909) 212 U. S. 414, 29
Sup. Ct. 357, 53 L. Ed. 577; Cedar Rapid Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids (1911)
223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389, 56 L. Ed. 594; Kansas City So. Ry. v. U. S.
(1913) 231 U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed. 296, 52 L. R. A. N. S. 1.3 Interstate Com. Comm. v. L. & N. Ry. (1913) 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct.
185, 57 L. Ed. 431; People ex rel. N. Y. Gas Co. v. McCall (1917) 245 U. S.
344, 38 Sup. Ct. 122, 62 L. Ed. 337; A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. U. S. (1931) 284
U. S. 248, 52 Sup. Ct. 146, 76 L. Ed. 273.
4 Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases) (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33
Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511; B. & 0. R. R. v. U. S. (1924) 264 U. S. 258,
44 Sup. Ct. 317, 68 L. Ed. 667; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Union P. Ry.,
supra, note 2.
5 United States v. Abilene & So. Ry. (1924) 265 U. S. 288, 44 Sup. Ct.
565, 67 L. Ed. 1023; I. C. C. v. L. & N. Ry., supra, note 3.
6 Southern Pac. Ry. v. I. C. C. (1911) 219 U. S. 445, 31 Sup. Ct. 288,
55 L. Ed. 287; Florida E. By. v. U. S. (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34 Sup. Ct.
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refused to consider evidence which was introduced,8 or which, as matter of
law, it was bound to consider. 9 The judicial review asserted in these cases
has to do essentially with "due process" in the purely procedural sense. This
is obvious in the cases where orders not involving rates have been scrutinized
solely in what may be called their adjectival aspects.10 But when the court
reviews the "reasonableness" of rates or the "fairness" of valuations, in-
quiring whether evidence supports a finding or must be considered "as a
matter of law," it inevitably suggests a review of administrative method in
a more substantive sense.1
The leading case' 2 seems to hold that rates may be set aside as well for
arbitrary and unreasonable action in fixing them as for confiscatory effect.
And Cardozo, J., recently observed that "they may be challenged for other
reasons (than confiscatory effect) where they are without evidence support-
ing them and are merely arbitrary edicts."' 3 It is believed that the true
meaning of such a statement is that administrative method is reviewable
only to determine whether it conforms to the familiar standards of due
process, e. g., notice, opportunity to enter evidence and examine opposing
evidence, judgment according to the evidence. And the scope of this pro-
cedural review is not enlarged when it is incident to the issue of confisca-
tion.1 4 In the cases principally relied on in the instant case the doctrine is
stated as follows: "When rates found by a regulatory body to be compensa-
tory are attacked as being confiscatory, the courts may inquire into the
method by which its conclusion was reached."' 5 The cases announcing this
doctrine so broadly did not involve valuation and they restrict their review
to the accepted strict procedural elements.16 Since then the Court, treating
867, 58 L. Ed. 1267; Ann Arbor R. Co. v. U. S. (1930) 281 U. S. 658, 50
Sup. Ct. 444, 74 L. Ed. 1098.
7 Atlantic C. Ry. v. N. C. Corp. Comm. (1906) 206 U. S. 20, 27 Sup. Ct.
585, 51 L. Ed. 942; So. Pac. Ry. v. I. C. C., supra, note 6.
STexas & Pac. Ry. v. I. C. C. (1895) 163 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40
L. Ed. 940; B. & 0. Ry. v. U. S., supra, note 4.
9 St. Louis & O'Fallon R. v. U. S. (1929) 279 U. S. 462, 49 Sup. Ct. 384,
78 L. Ed. 798; Missouri ex rel. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (1922)
262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981, 31 A. L. R. 807.
10 Especially in the Abilene Case, supra, note 5, and the so-called Chicago
Junction Case (B. & 0. R. v. U. S.) supra, note 4, and People ex rel. v.
McCall, supra, note 3.
11 See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Missouri ex rel. v. Public Serv. Comm.,
supra, note 9, and Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (New
York, 1931) pp. 417-452, especially at p. 452.
12 Interstate Com. Comm. v. Union Pac. Ry., supra, note 2.
"3 Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. U. S. (1933) 288 U. S. 294, 53 Sup.
Ct. 350, 77 L. Ed. 796.
14 Barnes, "Federal Courts and State Regulation of Utility Rates," 43
Yale Law Journal 417.
15 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Dept. of Public Works (1925) 268 U. S. 39, 45
Sup. Ct. 412, 69 L. Ed. 836, 1. c. 268 U. S. 46; Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. v.
Pub. Utility Comm. of Idaho (1927) 274 U. S. 344, 47 Sup. Ct. 604, 71
L. Ed. 1085, 1. c. 274 U. S. 351.
26 The cases in note 15 were apparently the first to state the doctrine just
this way, but it is believed that the aim was merely to crystallize principles
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/16
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the valuation question in a most clarifying opinion, has pointed out that the
sole constitutional issue is whether the rates fixed are confiscatory and the
legislative (administrative) method is relevant only as it "may have a
definite bearing upon the validity of the result reached." 17 It is the valua-
tion cases that have opened the complex question of "fair value"18 to the
independent judgment of the courts.1 9 It is in these cases that the Supreme
Court has seemed, more than once, to have found rates confiscatory simply
because it disapproved the method of valuation used by the commission. 2 D
Yet the courts have consistently denied, as did the District Court in the
present case, that it was within their "limited constitutional function ...
to reject the valuation merely because of an erroneous method." 21 The
Supreme Court has said repeatedly that it does not sit as a board of revision,
to reweigh evidence or to enforce its notions of wisdom or expediency.22
It has expressly avowed that "it is enough if we cannot say that it was
impossible for a fair-minded board to come to the result which was
reached." 23 Unfortunately, the Court has not always kept so clear the dis-
tinction between its own functions and those of the administrative agencies
whose orders it reviews.24
The present case, as well as many recent valuation cases, illustrates a
current tendency to extend judical review quite beyond the above salutary
limitation. The most doubtful eventuality of opening to judicial review the
previously announced and not to propose a new reach of judicial review into
administrative method.Los Angeles Gas and Elect. Corp. v. R. R. Comm. of Calif. (1933) 289
U. S. 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637, 77 L. Ed. 1180. See Barnes' article in 43 Yale
L. J. 417, cited note 14 supra, which is largely a discussion of this case and
the problems suggested by it.Is Smyth v. Ames (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819;
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1908) 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53
L. Ed. 382. See also Simpson v. Shepard, supra, note 4.19 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287,
40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908. For discussion of problems in judicial re-
view raised by this case see Note (1933) 31 Michigan Law Review 1169.
20 Note especially Bluefield Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. of West Va.
(1922) 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176, where valuation was
set aside for failure to give "proper weight" to evidence of reproduction
cost. See also the opinion and the dissent in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316, especially note 5
at 272 U. S. 422. Cf. statements in all these cases that no one standard of
valuation is conclusive.
21 Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. West, supra, note 1.
22 See divers citations supra: I. C. C. v. Ill. Cent. R., note 2; I. C. C. v.
L. & N. Ry., note 3; U. S. v. Abilene R., note 5; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Dept. of
Pub. Works, note 15; Los Angeles Gas & Elect. Co. v. R. R. Comm., note 16.
See Brandeis', J., lengthy and able dissent in St. L. & O'Fallon Ry. Case,
supra, note 9.
23 San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper (1903) 189 U. S. 439, 23 Sup.
Ct. 571, 47 L. Ed. 892, per Holmes, J.
24 United Railways. Co. v. West (1929) 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123,
74 L. Ed. 390. See Merrill, "The Distinction between Non-Confiscatory Rates
and Just and Reasonable Rates" (1929) 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 447.
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methods of regulatory agencies in reaching their conclusions as well as the
legal sufficiency of their procedure is that valuations will be found confisca-
tory, not on economic considerations, but solely because the court disapproves
the commission's method. That the administrative method may become the
constitutional issue is implicit in the majority opinion in the instant case
when it says: "the entire method of the Commission was erroneous and its
use necessarily involved unjust and inaccurate results." This is arguable to
say the least, and it is the real basis of the decision. The review of com-
mission action here assumed is definitely beyond both the strict procedural
limits and the issue of confiscation.25 It goes even further than the valuation
cases where commissions have been reversed for failing to consider evidence
which the Court held them bound to consider.2 6 It is quite contrary in
spirit to other recent cases 27 which have given the methods and findings of
expert administrative agencies the respect which precedent2s and sound
judicial principles enjoin upon the court. The Court has condemned a con-
scientious and expert attempt at valuation without definitely impugning
the result on any other ground. Again the law seems to have thrown into
the economic perplexities of utility regulatory agencies another element of
confusion and unpredictability.
C. M. W. '36.
TAXATWoN-MISSOURI INHERITANcE TAX-DEDUCTION or FEDERAL TAx.-
When an estate is appraised for the purpose of assessing the state inheri-
tance tax should the federal estate tax assessment be deducted from the
value of the estate? This question has recently been answered in the
affirmative by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of In re Rosing's
Estate.' In this case the court sustained the contention of the executor that
such a deduction should be made, holding that Missouri's tax was an in-
heritance tax and not an estate tax.
The term "inheritance tax" is often used by the courts to indicate any
kind of a death duty. Strictly speaking, an inheritance tax is a tax on the
right of succession, the right of the heirs, devisees, or heirs to take an in-
terest in property upon the death of the owner. Another kind of death duty
is an estate tax, a tax on the right of the owner to transfer property at his
death either by will or intestacy. The problem raised in the case of In re
Rosing's Estate may be settled only after it is decided whether the federal
and state duties are inheritance or estate taxes.
25 Suggested in notes 3 to 9 inclusive.
26 Referred to in notes 9 and 18.
27 Los Angeles Gas & Elect. Corp. v. R. R. Comm., supra, note 17; Central
Kentucky Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm. (1933) 290 U. S. 264, 54 Sup. Ct. 154, 78
L. Ed. 307; Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Pub. Service Comm. (1934) 291
U. S. 227, 54 Sup. Ct. 427, 78 L. Ed. 767; Dayton Power and Light Co. v.
Pub. Utilities Comm. (1934) 292 U. S. 310, 54 Sup. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 1267.2
8 Illinois Cent. R. v. I. C. C. (1906) 206 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 700, 51
L. Ed. 1128.
1 (1935) Mo., 85 S. W. (2d) 495.
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